Skip to main content
University of Pennsylvania
School of Arts and Sciences
P
enn
E
conomics
IER
PIER
PFSRDC
PISM
Toggle navigation
Main navigation
Home
About
Undergraduate
Graduate
People
Courses
Events
News
Research
Search Results
Search
Dynamic Political Investigations: Obstruction and the Optimal Timing of Accusations - Job Talk
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information
Juan Escobar
Sergiu Hart
Weijie Zhong
Optimal Informationally-Robust Auction Design
Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions
Broad Matching and the Market for Search Platforms
Sequential Learning with Endogenous Consideration Sets
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals
Johannes Hörner
Micro Theory Seminar - MU
Nicolas Lambert
Idione Meneghel
Pagination
First page
« First
Previous page
‹‹
…
Page
25
Page
26
Page
27
Page
28
Current page
29
Page
30
Page
31
Page
32
Page
33
…
Next page
››
Last page
Last »
© 2024 The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania