Economics 212 Honors Game Theory

Andrew Postlewaite

Fall, 2016

- This is an honors game theory class; permission is necessary to enroll.
- Department policies: Students are responsible for making sure, at the beginning of the term, that they can attend the exams. Registering for a course means that you certify that you will be present for the exam (unless one of the explicitly stated exceptions found in the policies arises.) All policy procedures may be found in the Undergrad Drop Down menu under Departmental Policies.
- The instructor is Professor Andrew Postlewaite (room 458 McNeil building, phone: 898-7350, office hours: Friday 1:30-2:30 or by appointment). The grader for the course is will be announced and his or her office hours will be announced. The class will meet Mondays and Wednesdays 10:30 12:00.
- The policy in this course is that the beginning of every class will open for any questions about problem sets or past lectures. This is the time to ask questions rather than asking the TA or coming to my office hours. The benefit of a small honors class is that there is time to do this, and you should get used to this format. I'm happy to talk to you about other courses you might take or about future plans including graduate school etc. during office hours.
- No phones, no internet.
- Problem sets will be assigned periodically and will be a nontrivial part of your grade.

- There will be a midterm exam on October 24. The midterm will count approximately 40% and the final 60% in determining the final grade for the course; grades may be modestly adjusted based on class participation (or nonparticipation). There will be no makeup exam for the midterm. The grade for anyone who does not take the midterm and has a valid excuse will be based on the final exam. The final exam is scheduled for 9:00 December 22. There will not be any chance to take the exam at a different time so take careful note of the date.
- The textbook for the course is An Introduction to Game Theory by Osborne (O).
- There are slides on Canvas that give a fairly detailed outline of what we will be doing. These are meant to be a guide to what we discuss in class. They are NOT exhaustive; for example, many definitions are in the textbook and are not included in the slides.

The coverage of game theory is pretty standard and there are many other textbooks that you can look at for additional detail. The lectures follow the treatment of the topics in textbook fairly closely. Below is a list of the topics and order in which we will treat them. There will be deviations from this, but hopefully it will be helpful.

Rational Choice

(O) 1.2

Games with Perfect Information

(O) Chapter 2
Ex 14.1, 16.1, 18.2, 19.1, 20.2, 33.1, 39.1

More on Nash Equilibria

(O) Sections 3.1 - 3.4

Mixed Strategy Equilibria
(O) Section 4.1 - 4.3.3
Ex 114.4, 143.1
Extensive Games with Perfect Information

(O) Chapter 5
Ex 155.2, 176.3

More on Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Examples

(O) Chapters 5, 6

6.1 Ultimatum game
6.2 Stackelberg
(O) Chapter 7
Ex 207.1, 210.3
Section 7.3
Repeated Games

(O) Chapter 14
14.2.1 Discounting
14.3 Repeated games
14.4 Finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.5 - 7 Infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Ex 429.1
14.8 "Folk Theorem"
Ex 433.1
14.9 One-shot deviation principle
14.10, 11 Subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Bargaining

(O) Chapter 1616.1,2 Extensive form for bargaining Ex's 468.1, 473.1, 479.1

16.3 Axiomatic bargaining Ex 489.1

Games with Imperfect Information

(O) Chapter 9

9.1 Introduction to imperfect information Ex 273.1, 276.1

9.2 Bayesian games

Ex 282.1

9.3 Examples of Bayesian games

9.4 Cournot with imperfect information

9.6 Auctions

Ex 299.1(G) Chapter 3

Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information

(G) Chapter 3
(O) Chapter 10
10.1-3 Introduction
Ex 314.2, 315.1, 319.1, 322.1
10.4 Beliefs and sequential equilibrium
Ex's 327.2-4, 330.1, 331.1
10.5 Signalling games
10.7 Education as a signal
10.8 Information transmission
10.9 Agenda Control
Cooperative Games
(O) Chapter 8
8.5 House exchange
8.7 Matching