## 1 A Pure Exchange Economy with Household Heterogeneity

Consider a stochastic pure exchange economy where the current state of the economy is described by  $s_t \in S = \{s_1, \ldots, s_M\}$ . Event histories are denoted by  $s^t$  and the initial node  $s_0$  is fixed. Probabilities of event histories are given by  $\pi_t(s^t)$ . There are 2 different types of households with equal mass normalized to 1. Households potentially differ in their endowment stream  $\{e_t^i(s^t)\}$ , their initial asset position  $a_0^i$  and their time discount factors  $\beta_i \in (0, 1)$ . Preferences for each household over consumption allocations  $c^i = \{c_t^i(s^t)\}$  are given by

$$u^{i}(c^{i}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{t} \in S^{t}} (\beta_{i})^{t} \pi_{t}(s^{t}) U(c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})).$$

where U(.) is strictly increasing and strictly concave.

1. Suppose that  $S = \{s_1, s_2\}$  and that  $\pi_t(s^t)$  is Markov with transition matrix

$$\pi(s'|s) = \left(\begin{array}{cc} \rho & 1-\rho\\ 1-\kappa & \kappa \end{array}\right)$$

where  $\rho, \kappa \in [0, 1]$  are parameters. For which parameter combinations  $(\rho, \kappa)$  is the associated invariant distribution  $\Pi$ 

- (a) Unique?
- (b) Satisfies  $\Pi = (0.8, 0.2)$ ?
- 2. Suppose that households can trade a full set of Arrow securities. Define a sequential markets equilibrium, for arbitrary  $\{a_0^i\}_{i \in 1,2}$  with  $\sum_i a_0^i = 0$ .
- 3. Define a recursive competitive equilibrium.
- 4. Suppose that the aggregate endowment satisfies, for  $t \geq 0$

$$e_t(s^t) = 2(1+g)^t$$

with g>0, and that  $\beta_1=\beta_2$  as well as

$$U(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma}.$$

The individual endowments satisfy  $e_t^i(s^t) > 0$  for all  $i, t, s^t$ , but no further assumptions are given, of course apart from

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} e_t^i(s^t) = e_t(s^t) = 2(1+g)^t.$$

Characterize as fully as possible the sequential market equilibrium consumption allocations and the prices of Arrow securities.

- 5. Compute the risk-free interest rate in this economy.
- 6. Now suppose that households cannot borrow, that is, impose  $a_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1}) \ge 0$  and also assume that  $1 > \beta_1 > \beta_2$  and  $a_0^1 = a_0^2 = 0$  and

$$e_t^i(s^t) = (1+g)^t$$

for both i = 1, 2. Repeat questions 4. and 5.