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Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment
Ed Hopkins
Mediated Persistence
The Optimal Design of a Criminal Justice System
Jacopo Perego
Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
Innovation in Decentralized Markets
Cautiousness
Jason Hartline
Rational Observational Learning
Ran Spiegler
Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification
Optimal Delegation and Regulation
Micro Theory Seminar - Eden
Efe Ok
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