"Rationalizability in Auctions" by In-KooCho (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
"Folk theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring" by Johannes Horner and Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern University)
"Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability" by Jeff Ely and Marcin Peski (Northwestern University)
"Interim Rationalizability" by Eddie Dekel (Tel Aviv University), Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) and Stephen Morris (Yale University)
"Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium" by Jonathan Weinstein and Muhamet Yildiz (Massachusetts Institute of Technlogy)
"On the Trade-off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and The Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee" by Tymon Tatur (Princeton University)
"Efficiency of Large Double Auctions" by Martin Cripps and Jeroen Swinkels (Washington University in St. Louis, Olin School of Business)